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1. The Three Logics of American Empire 

"In Ood we Trust. " 	 "Ood Bless America., land that I love ... " 
- Irving Berlin (1938), America's unofficial "national anthem" Official Motto of the United States of America 
"I pledge allegiance to the jlag 0/ the United "Ood money Pll do anything for you 
States 0/America, and to the republic for wh ich it Ood money just tell me what you want me to 
stands, one nation, under Ood, indivisible, with God money nail me up against the wall 
liberty and justice for all. " God money don't want everything he wants it all" 
- Francis Bellamy (1892) and U.S. Congress (1954) - Nine Inch Nails, Head Like a Hole (1989, by Trent Reznor) 
On Decelnber 2, 2002, The New York Times reported that Karl Rove, President George W. 
Bush's leading political advisor, had admitted to engineering the hiring ofRalph Reed, the former 
executive director of the Christian Coalition, by the Enron Corporation. Rove' s admission was 
made in the midst of a v.S. Securities and Exchange Commission investigation into Enron's ille­
gal accounting practices and the discovery that it had nl0nopolistically manipulated wholesale 
energy supplies to create an artificial "energy shortage" in Califomia that brought the state's util­
ity industry to the brink of financial collapse, while generating enonnous illegal profits for Enron. 
Enron paid Reed as much as $10,000 to $20,000 monthly during the period between his hiring in 
September of 1997 and the company's collapse in late 2001. 
Reed was hired by Enron just when President Bush was organizing his D.S. Presidential cam­
paign and Rove's associates openly admit that the high paying consulting job with Enron was a 
way of fInning up Reed' s support for Bush' s candidacy at a time when other Republicans were 
trying to win support from key leaders of America' s Christian Right. Reed threw his support be­
hind the Bush campaign in 2000 and most experts agree that Reed' s endorsement played an im­
portant part in the President' s primary victories and contributed to his success in the general 
election.1 
1 	 When reporters asked Reed about his relationship with Enron, he denied that his hiring was a fonn of political pa­
tronage and instead claimed that his consulting work for the company involved helping "with an Enron campaign 
in Pennsylvania to win a central role in the state's electricity market." There is nothing in Reed's background that 
qualified him as an expert on electric power so most astute ob servers concluded that his consultancy with the com­
pany was a patronage appointment designed to cement Enron's connections to the highest circles of D.S. state 
power, including access to Vice President Dick Cheney, who has refused to disclose any details ab out his contacts 
with Enron during the critical period when he was shaping the Bush Administration's national energy policy. 
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It is no longer surprising to a cynical American electorate when politicians and corporate execu­
tives cöllude to serve each other' s mutual interests,2 but much of the public was shocked to dis­
cover that moralizing leaders of the Christian right had also become inside players in the Wash­
ington power game as high paid consultants to the political and corporate establishment, which 
hardly modeled the ethical standard set by Jesus Christ, who so plainly said that: 
"No one can serve two masters .. You cannot serve both God and Money.,,3 
The direct collusion between God, Money, and the State exemplified in the Ralph Reed incident 
is not unprecedented in American history, but rather i1lustrates the central thesis of this paper. 
The political development of American Empire, which has received so much attention in recent 
scholarly literature, occurs at the peculiar conjuncture of three "logics" which develop independ­
ently at the cultural (ideological), political, and economic levels of the American social forma­
tion, but which periodically intersect to generate violent outward thrusts of political expansion, 
which simultaneously advance the interests of the economically <;lominant class and its political 
elite with the legitimating cultural underpinnings of religious messianism. 
My thesis is consistent with a Marxian structuralist analysis, which claims that the development 
of a individual social formations should be conceptualized in terms of the interactions between an 
economic base, legal and political superstructures, and the forms of social consciousness peculiar 
to that sodal formation with the economic being determinative "in the last instance." In general, 
each level of a concrete sodal formation has its own internal logic or historical rhythm that is 
relatively autonomous from the other levels of the social formation. The relative separation of the 
economic, political, and ideological structures means that each level of a social formation devel­
ops according to its own internal time sequence, but· each level periodically "intervenes" through 
its effects in other structures to create what Nicos Poulantzas calls: 
" ... the unstable equilibrium of correspondence/non-correspondence of levels dislocated in 
their own time sequences, this equilibrium is never given by the economic as such, but is 
maintained by the state .... the state has the particular function ofconstituting the factor of 
cohesion between the levels 0/a sodalformation.,,4 
2 For instance, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); G. William Dom­
hoff, The Powers That Be: The Processes 01 Ruling Class Domination in America (New York: Vintage Books, 
1979). 
3 Holy Bible (King James version), Matthew 6:24. 
4 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: Verso, 1978), p. 44. 
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This paper argues that Empire is the particular state form that provides a factor of cohesion to the 
American social formation. This state form was consciously designed by the Founders of the 
American republic and linked culturally to an American civil religion that is routinely invoked by 
American politicalleaders to legitimate the expansion of Empire. Thus, a first component of this 
larger thesis rests on the observation that American political culture is periodically "overdeter­
mined" at the ideological level by recurring cycles of evangelical religious messianism. These 
cultural cycles or the logic of messianism -- are described by historians of religion and Ameri­
can culture as "Great Awakenings" that periodically sweep through the American population and 
typically last for two to three generations (40 to 60 years). These Great Awakenings have been 
imbued with a sense of messianie national mission since the first English settlement of the 
American continent. It is widely agreed that the United States is now in the midst of its Fourth 
Great Awakening. 
Second, political historians have often observed that American political life is characterized by 
the ebb and flow of periodic populist revolts followed by long periods of democratic acquies­
cence and unfettered capitalist accumulation.5 Paradoxically, most American "revolutions" are 
strikingly anti-statist and culturally conservative beginning with the American Revolution (1776­
1783), which was followed by the Great Revolution (1800-1808), the lacksonian Revolution 
(1828-1836), the Populist Revolt (1892-1900), the New Freedom (1912-1920), and more recently 
the "Reagan Revolution" (1980-1988). Finally, I conceptualize the phases of American capitalist 
development according to the periodization developed by the social structure of accumulation 
theorists (SSAT).6 SSA theory emphasizes that specific historical processes of capital accumu­
lation can only be sustained to the extent that cultural values, forms of business organization, 
government policy, law, educational institutions (i.e., superstructures) are compatible with the 
requirements of each new phase in the accumulation process. The interconnected matrix of eco­
nomic, social, and political institutions that support capital accumulation through a particular 
state form is called a socia! structure of accumulation.7 
5 James Allen Smith, The Spirit 0/American Government (New Y ork: Macmillan, 1907). 

6 David Gordon, "Stages ofAccumulation and Long Economic Cycles," in T. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein, eds., Pro­

cesses ofthe World System (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 9-45; Samuel Bowles, David M. Gordon, 
and Thomas E. Weisskopf, After the Wasteland: A Democratic Economics for the Year 2000 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1990), Chap. 2. 
7 For comparison, see, David M. Kotz, "A Comparative Analysis ofthe Theory ofRegulation and the Social Struc­
ture ofAccumulation Theory." Science and Society 54, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 5-28. 
Quite simply, when the three logics of messianism, empire, and capital accumulation coincide 
and reinforce each other at particular historical conjunctures they explode in violent proj ections 
of American military power. These bursts of Empire building occur when the cultural back­
ground (e.g., a Great Awakening) of American politics intersects with the economic interests of 
the dominant c1ass, who are able to deploy a political system structured for the creation of Em­
pire. These periods continue until one or more of the logics exhausts itself in the moral disillu­
sionment or political defeat of messianic evangelists; in military defeat or a political regime 
change; or the successful re-stabilization of American capitalism on the basis of a new social 
structure of accumulation. 
2. The Logic Messianism 
When the Massachusetts Bay colonists sailed for America on March 22, 1630, John Winthrop, 
the first Govemor of Massachusetts, left stately homes and financial security to sail into a dark 
and frightening American wildemess. It was a place where the approximately 700 Puritan colo­
nists knew they faced the daily prospect of death by disease, starvation, and Indian attack. As 
they contemplated this prospect on their voyage to the New World, Govemor Winthrop wrote 
and delivered a sermon entitled "A Modell of Christian Charity." Winthrop admonished the Pu­
ritan immigrants that the purpose of their voyage was to increase the body of Christ in America 
and to preserve themselves and their children from the corruption of an evil old world they were 
leaving behind. In making the trip to a N ew W orld uncorrupted by Mammon, the colonists were 
making a covenant to obey the commandments of God and if they did so the Lord would surely 
bless them in the new land so long as they continued to follow Him.8 In a passage that has echoed 
across the centuries, Govemor Winthrop told the Puritan settlers that if they maintained Christian 
faith he was certain that: 
" ... the Lord will be our God and delight to dweIl among us as his own people and will 
command a blessing upon us in all our ways ...We shall find that the God of Israel is 
among us, when ten of us shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies; when he shall 
make us a praise and glory, that rnen shall say of succeeding plantations, 'the Lord make 
8 	 John Winthrop, "A Modell of Christian Charity; Written on Board the Arbella, on the Atlantic Ocean (1630)," in 
Perry Miller, ed., The American Puritans: Their Prose and Poetry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 
Chap.2. 
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it like that ofNew England' . For we must consider that we shall be as a City upon a Hill. 
The eyes of all people are upon US.,,9 
In forging this special covenant with God, Winthrop and the Puritan colonists created a key ele­
ment of American cultural identity, which is periodically reaffirmed in the cycle of religious 
Great Awakenings that most often empt during periods of cultural or social dislocation. Win­
throp's metaphor ofChristian America as a city on a hilI became a motifthat has inspired Ameri­
can literary and political thought across three centuries as succeeding generations of Americans 
inherited the idea that their country was intended by Providence to serve as a moral example -- a 
beacon of light -- to the rest of the world. 10 Indeed, some years later, Winthrop wrote in his jour­
nal that the "Godly people in New England begin now to apprehend a special hand of God in 
raising this plantation."ll 
2.1. The Great Awakenings 
The Great Awakenings that have often drawn on Winthrop's imagery in fiery jerenliads against 
America' s "moral dec1ine" have been a powerful and constituting element of American political 
culture. William G. McLoughlin, one of the most renowned historians of American religion, 
points out that "Great awakenings are not periods of social neurosis (though they begin in times 
of cultural confusion)" and they may appear quite bizarre or even frightening to non-Americans. 
However, McLoughlin insists that Great Awakenings develop according to their own cultural 
logic and are not the results of depressions, wars, or epidemics, but of "critical disjunctions" in 
Americans' self-understanding of what it means to be American. McLoughlin points out that 
these periods of religious revivalism are not brief outbursts of mass emotionalism by small or 
isolated groups of American society, but the effect of profound cultural transformations affecting 
all Americans and extending over a generation or more. 
9 	 Winthrop's imagery was taken from the Holy Bible (King James' version) Matthew 5:14. Winthrop also teIls ofthe 
i11 consequences that will befall the Puritans if they fai! to keep their covenant: "Thus stands the cause between 
God and us ...Now ifthe Lord shall please to heare us, and bring us in peace to the p1ace wee desire, then hath hee 
ratified this covenant and sea1ed our Commission, and will expect a strict performance of the articles contained in 
it; but if wee shall neg1ect the observation of these artic1es which are the ends wee have propounded, and, dissem­
b1ing with our God, shall faH to embrace this present world and prosecute our carnall intentions, seeking greate 
things for ourse1ves and our posterity, the Lord will sure1y breake out in wrathe against us; be revenged of such a 
[sinfu1] peop1e and make us knowe the price of the breache of such a covenant. .... Soe that if wee shall deale 
falsely with our God in this worke wee have undertaken, and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us, 
wee shall be made a story and a by-word through the world." 
10 A small reminder of this inheritance is that the Massachusetts State Capitol in Boston, birthplace of the American 
Revolution, still sits atop "Beacon Hill." 
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However, the Great Awakenings operate on an irregu1ar cyc1e which sonletimes precede and 
sometimes overlap with the great popu1ar revolts in Anlerican po1itica1 history. For instance, the 
origins of the American Revolution (1776) can be traced to the 1atter part of the First Great 
Awakening (1720-1770), which carried word of Winthrop's American "covenant" across the 
thirteen co10nies to forge a unique sense of messianic national identity prior to the Revolution. 
The earliest stirrings of the First Great Awakening began in New Jersey in the 1720's with the 
evangelica1 preaching of Theodorus Fre1inghuysen, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church. fu 
New England, it was started in 1734 by the rousing preaching of Jonathan Edwards. The re­
vival in the Midd1e Co10nies was again ignited in New Jersey by Presbyterian ministers trained 
under William Tennent. His son Gi1bert Tennent became the 1eading figure of the Great Awak­
ening in the Midd1e Co10nies. Other preachers followed and with the ecumenica1 tour of George 
Whitefie1d (1739--41), the fanlous Methodist preacher from England, the iso1ated currents of re­
viva1ism were united and carried into all the co10nies. The revival reached the South with the 
preaching (1748-59) of Samue1 Davies among Presbyterians in Virginia, while Baptist preachers 
had great successes in North Caro1ina in the 1760s, which was then followed by the rapid spread 
ofMethodism short1y before the American Revolution. Aside from reaffirming a re1igious thread 
in American culture, the First Great Awakening served to increase contact between the co10nies 
and create institutiona1 (church) interests that were inter-co10nia1 in character. The spread of 
evange1ica1 Protestant denominations 1ed to an increase in hostility to the Anglican Church and to 
the royal officia1s who supported it, whi1e encouraging a more democratic spirit in religion. 12 
Short1y after the Constitution of 1789 exp1icit1y re-founded the nation on the 10gic ofEmpire (see 
be10w), a Second Great Awakening (1790-1850) followed sett1ers westward and infused them 
with a renewed sense of "manifest destiny." Following the Civil War (1861-1865), aperiod of 
rapid industria1ization (1870-1893), and the closing ofthe frontier (1893) that fu1filled this mani­
fest destiny, a Third Great Awakening (1890-1930) supp1ied the cu1tura1 background that 
launched America on its global crusade "to make the world safe for democracy." 
11 	 John Winthrop, A Journal 0/ the Transactions and Occurrences in the Settlement 0/Massachusetts and the other 
New England Colonies, from the Year 1630 to 1644 (Hartford: Elisha Babcock, 1790). 
12 	See Alan E. Heimert and Perry Miller, eds., Great Awakening: Documents Illustrating the Crisis and Its Conse­
quences (1967); Charles H. Maxson, The Great Awakening in theMiddle Co10nies (Chicago: University of Chi­
cago Press, 1920); Wesley M. Gewehr, The Great Awakening in Virginia, 1740-1790 (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter 
Smith, 1965); Edwin S. Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England (New York: Harper, 1957); Richard L. 
Bushman, ed., The Great Awakening (New York: Atheneum, 1970); Darrett B. Rutman, The Great Awakening 
(Huntington, N.Y.: R.E. Krieger Publishing Co., 1977). 
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Most cultural and religious historians agree that America entered a F ourth Great Awakening (or 
its fifth if one includes the Puritan Awakening) sometime in the late 1950s or early 1960s. 
McLoughlin argues that Americans have for some time been "in a difficult period of reorienta­
tion, seeking an understanding of who we are, how we relate to the rest of the universe, and what 
the meaning is of the manifold crises that threaten our sense of order at horne and our commit­
ments as a world power abroad.,,13 In many respects, contemporary Americans have been grap­
pling with all the same phenomena and issues that have confused them in the past - immigration, 
cultural diversification, the country's place and destiny in the world (i.e., empire), and the mean­
ing of economic prosperity (i.e., materialism) in a nation whose identity derives from a covenant 
with God. 
In one of the most ambitious efforts to understand the current Great Awakening, Robert William 
Fogel suggests that we need to understand the developmental pattern of these recurring political­
religious cycles, which he suggests emerge and dissipate in three phases. A Great Awakening 
begins with a phase of religious revival. The religious revivals are followed by a phase of rising 
political activity. A final phase occurs when the new ethics and politics of the religious awaken­
ing come und er increasing challenge within society and the political coalition promoted by the 
awakening goes into dec1ine. 14 
2.2. The F ourth Great Awakening 
The most recent phase of religious revivalism was ignited in the late 1950s by the Billy Graham 
Evangelical Crusade (BGEC) (1956 - 1979). As the BGEC and other evangelical "crusades" 
gained momentum during the 1960s, conservative Protestant church leaders in the United States, 
including foreign mission executives, pastors, and denominational leaders, increasingly saw a 
need to c1arify the burgeoning movement's theological positions. The ideological turning point 
in this early revival phase was reached at the Congress on the Church's World Wide Mission held 
in Wheaton, Illinois from April 9 to 16, 1966. The meeting was sponsored by the Foreign Mis­
sions Association (FMA) and the Interdenominational Foreign Mission Association (IFMA) and 
13 William G. McLoughlin, Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform: An Essay on Religion and Social Change in America, 
16-7-1977 (Cbicago: University ofCbicago Press, 1978), 
see, http://www.csp.org/chrestomathy/revivals_awakenings.html 
14 Robert William Fogei, The Fourth Great Awakening & the Future ofEgalitarianism (Cbicago: University of Cbi­
cago Press, 2000). I have significant reservations about Fogel's periodization of the Great Awakenings, wbich he 
suggests last ab out 100 years each in contrast to most bistorians who put them at 40 to 60 years. He also proposes 
an explanation ofthe Great Awakenings that is oddly a technologically determinist one. Nevertheless, bis identifi­
cation of the "three phases" is compelling and persuasive. 
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was convened at the headquarters of the Billy Graham Evangelical Association (BGEA). The 
Congress was attended by 938 delegates from 258 mission boards active in 71 countries. One of 
the end results of the Congress was a statement of theological principles called "The Wheaton 
Declaration" that was unanimously adopted by the delegates. 15 
The stated rationale for the Congress was the need to reconsider Christianity' s "worldwide mis­
sion" in the emerging context of globalization, which at the time was an idea scarcely being dis­
cussed by scholars, public officials, or even the executives of multi-national corporations. The 
Declaration essentially proclaimed aglobai Christian crusade among evangelists with its state­
ment that: 
"On this shrinking planet, with all human affairs moving toward an age of universality 
never previously witnessed, many voices call for areligion that has universal validity. 
The gospel of Jesus Christ is the message that has this validity ....God is sovereign in our 
times. We believe in Hirn, in the progress ofHis gospel, and in His triumph in history.,,16 
The Congress was nominally apolitical,17 although it explicitly recognized that in the future 
evangelical Protestants would need "to apply Scriptural principles to such problems as racism, 
war, population explosion, poverty, family disintegration, social revolution, and communism.,,18 
The Declaration also envisioned a more "militarized" version of the evangelical crusade with its 
clainl that the smaller world created by globalization: 
" ... is hostile to the Church because it is hostile to God. His Church is at war ... In our age, 
however, this hostility has been intensified by the rise of atheistic communism, extreme 
nationalism, resurgent ethnic religions, secularism, and corrupted forms of Christianity.,,19 
As a church at war with other religions, the Congress concluded that evangelicals "have an obli­
gation to ex amine religious movements that challenge the uniqueness and finality of Biblical 
Christianity," while noting in particular (and well before Samuel Huntington) that "Noll-Christian 
15 	 Wheaton Declaration: Subscribed by the Delegates to the Congress on the Church 's Worldwide Mission convened 
at Wheaton, Illinois, April 9-16, 1966, see, http://www.wheaton.eduJbgc/archives/docs/wd66/b01.html. A copy of 
the Declaration can also be found in the published proceedings of the Congress, Study Papers: Congress on the 
Church's Worldwide Mission, April 9-16, 1966, Wheaton, Illinois., GIen Ellyn, Illinois: Scripture Press Founda­
tion, 1966. 
16 Ibid., pp. 10, 7. 
17 "The Congress, due to inherent limitations, was unable to discuss some important subjects of current inter­
est ... Nothing was said about the Jews. War and peace were not discussed. Communism as such was not on the 
agenda. The role ofthe United Nations and China's relation to it and the world were exc1uded. The Congress de­
liberately limited its discussions," Ibid., p. 3. 
18 Ibid., p. 7. 
19 Ibid., p. 25. 
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religious systems, such as Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism in their new missionary vigor pose an 
oppressive threat to the growth of the Church. ,,20 Thus, in declaring a new crusade at both horne 
and abroad, the Wheaton Declaration reaffirmed its signatories " ... trust in the sovereign God, 
His triumph in history, and the victory of His Church," while noting that "The Scriptures em­
phatically declare that Christ will return when the gathering of his true Church is completed. All 
human history shall be consummated in Him.,,21 
Although one could easily dismiss the new crusade as the mere rantings of a few evangelical 
Protestant ministers (and many did), the Reverend Billy Graham was a long-time associate of 
Richard Nixon, who would be elected President of the United States only two years after the 
Wheaton Declaration. After the political and cultural turbulence of the 1960s, America's first 
humiliation in modem war (Vietnam), followed by the chronic economic dislocations of the 
1970s, the restoration of America's covenant with God assumed the form of a "return to tradi­
tional American values." As the Christian "New Right" became more politicized and applied 
"Scriptural principle" to American politics, its moral and cultural agenda would help prope1 the 
Republican party - long known as the party of business -- to long-term majority status in Ameri­
can politics. 
America's Fourth Great Awakening entered its explicitly political phase in 1979 when the Rever­
end Jerry Falwelljoined forces with several Republican party strategists, including Paul Weyrich, 
Richard Viguerie, and Howard Phillips to found the Moral Majority. By 1981, the Moral Major­
ity had become the new crusade's "disciplined, charging army.,,22 The key tenets of the Moral 
Majority' s political philosophy was "to defend the free enterprise system, the family, and Bible 
morality.,,23 Its long-term political goal was to politicize and unify a frustrated and fragmented 
fundamentalist religious community and mold it into a powerful voting bloc behind the Republi­
can party. Strategists such as Viguerie saw an opportunity to break the New Deal political coali­
tion by diverting the nation's domestic political agenda away from economic and distributive is­
sues to social and cultural issues by bemoaning America' s moral, political, and military "dec1ine" 
as a fall from the grace of the covenant. The Moral Majority appealed mainly to Protestants, but 
it invited all morally conservative Americans who believed in its tenets, including orthodox J ews, 
Catholics, and Mormons to join it as political allies. The Moral Majority played a significant role 
20 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
21 Ibid., pp. 25, 7. 
22 Frances Fitzgerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army," The New Yorker, May 18, 1981. 
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in the 1980 elections that launched the Reagan Revolution through its strong support of conser­
vative candidates. It lobbied for prayer and the teaching of creationism in public schools, while 
opposing homo sexual rights, abortion, sex education in the schools, pomography, and the Equal 
Rights Amendment for women. It supported a strong national defense, was strongly pro-Israel, 
and stridently anticommunist in its foreign policy positions, such as opposing the V.S.-Soviet 
Strategie Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT). 
The Moral Majority c1aimed a constituency of 50 million supporters, who tumed out in large 
numbers for the 1980 election that elected Ronald Reagan to the V.S. Presidency. Falwell esti­
mated that the Moral Majority's political campaign added 3 to 4 million registered voters to con­
servative causes in 1980 and raised $11 million for lobbying efforts in 1984. At its peak, the or­
ganization was raising $350 million to $500 million a year. The Moral Majority's broad conser­
vative agenda was the basis for its initial appeal to so many people, but this same multiplicity of 
issues eventually led to its fracture.24 Fundamentalists and conservatives with narrower interests 
became increasingly frustrated with the Moral Majority's diffuse platform, as well the numerous 
political misstatements and embarrassments by its leaders. Many of its leaders left the Moral 
Majority to fom1 n10re focused splinter groups, such as Operation Rescue (anti-abortion), and this 
fracturing gradually drained membership and resources from the Moral Majority until Jerry Fal­
well terminated it in 1989.25 
The vacuum created by the Moral Majority' s demise was quickly filled by the Christian Coalition 
of America, which was founded by Pat Robertson in 1989. The Christi an Coalition calls itself 
"the leading grassroots organization defending our Christian heritage. ,,26 According to Pat Rob­
ertson, its minister/economist founder, the Christian Coalition was established: 
" ... as a pro-family citizen action organization to impact public policy on a local, state, 
and national level. The Coalition also serves to teach Christians effective citizenship, and 
to promote Christian values in government.,,27 
23 John Saloma III, Ominous PolWes (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1984). 
24 Richard John Neuhaus and Michael Cromartie, eds, Piety and Polities: Evangelieals and Fundamentalists Con­
front the World (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987). 
25 	 Gustav Niebhur, "Why 'Moral Majority,' A Force for a Decade, Ran Out of Stearn," The Wall Street Journal, 
September 25, 1989. See, 
http://www.publiceye.org/research/Group_WatchlEntries-92.htm 
26 See, http://www.cc.orgl 
27 Pat Robertson, "Message frorn the Founder," see, http://www.cc.orgiaboutcca/patmessageI.htrnl 
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Pat Robertson attempted to complete the union of evangelical messianism and the Republican 
party by challenging George H. Bush in the 1992 Republican party primaries, by labeling him 
(correct1y) as a representative the party's "old" corporate establishment, who was timid in pursu­
ing the New Right's cultural agenda. There was growing concem among evangelicals and other 
cultural conservatives that the party' s corporate establishment had delivered on the conservative 
economic agenda (i.e., Reaganomics), but had failed to deliver any significant victories on the 
new social and cultural agenda.28 In a 1992 fundraising letter for his D.S. Presidential campaign, 
Robertson wrote: 
"The feminist agenda is not about equal rights for women. It is about a socialist, anti­
family political movement that encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their chil­
dren, practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism, and become lesbians. ,,29 
Despite Pat Robertson's intellectual c1umsiness, the jumble of ideas contained in this and many 
other such statements resonated with much of America and certainly with the Christian Coali­
tion' s followers. F or instance, the Reverend Bill Banuchi, Executive Director of the N ew Y ork 
chapter of the Christian Coalition states emphatically that "in a Socialistic America the Govem­
ment will place itself in the seat ofAlmighty God and claim to be the Supreme Power over all the 
people. This is already happening ....This was never the intent of the founders [of the American 
Republic].,,30 In yet another exemplary sermon delivered on January 27, 2002 by Jennifer Mills­
Knutsen, a Christian Coalition minister, a basic theme of the new crusade was reiterated: 
" ... a battle is brewing. We, donning crosses and carrying bibles, live in the serpent's lair. 
At the crossroads of humanity, we will face anmes of stars, crescents, Buddhas and 
Krishna. Victory is the only way forward. Our side must eliminate the other for all 
time .... Startling words? Yes, but throughout its 2000-year history, Christianity has often 
28 For example, Ralph Reed, former president ofthe Christian Coalition notes "that sentiment in the religious conser­
vative community very different from a Wall Street or Chamber of Commerce style Republican in the Buchanan 
candidacy of 1996 where he really made an issue out of the treatment of workers and how we had to take care of 
those who are being left behind. Y ou know, again, you can debate and Republicans do debate whether he is right 
or wrong on the merits of trade policy and integration policy, but there's no doubt about the fact that the rhetoric 
and the political style of aBuchanan, who is a religious conservative candidate, is very different from a Wall Street 
style candidate," see, "Church and State," Transcript of an Interview of Ralph Reed by David Geren, June 6, 1996, 
PBS, see, http://www. pbs. org/newshour/ gergenlreed _6-6 .html 
29 Pat Robertson quoted in http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7027/quotes.html 
30 Reverend Bill Banuchi quoted in http://www.nychristiancoalition.org/ABG2000.htm 
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envisioned itself in this way--dominating the world in Christ's name, converting all to 
one mind.,,31 
With doctorate in hand, Ralph Reed succeeded Pat Robertson as head of the Christian Coalition 
and he echoed this grand messianie vision for the Christian New Right in his book Active Faith 
(1996). Reed quite self-consciously understands the current Great Awakening as a continuation 
of America' s cycle of religious revivalism and areaffirmation of its special covenant, but he ar­
gues that the current awakening "is on ascale that is almost without precedence .... when Jerry 
Falwell founded the Moral Majority, he was literally leading a people out ofthe wilderness." 32 
3. The Logic of Empire 
It is perhaps G.W.F. Hegel who best captures the American political theodicy in his Philosophy 
ofHistory. Hegel considered the State "the perfeet embodiment of Spirit," but in The Philosophy 
ofHistory, he also historicizes this abstract philosophical claim by identifying "the definite sub­
stance that receives the form of universality" in the State with "the Spirit of the People .... which 
erects itself into an objective world." However, because the State is an abstraction (i.e., an Idea) 
in Hegel's system, he points out that "it is only by a Constitution that the abstraction - the State ­
attains life and reality" in historical time.33 Constitutions concretize the idea of the State as areal 
historical embodiment of the spirit of a people. Significantly, Hegel argued that America did not 
have a "real" state to fully embody and actualize the spirit of its people and, therefore, at the time 
he wrote, the United States existed outside the dialectic of historical time as seen from Europe. 
Thus, in a wonderfully prophetie passage Hegel points to America as "the land of the future, 
where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself.,,34 
31 Jennifer Mills-Knutsen, "The Old South Church in Boston: Cosmopolitan Christianity?", 
see, http://world.std.com/-eshuJosc/sermons/jmk27jan02.htm 
32 Reed observes that "the electorate that was mainline Protestant, Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal, had declined 
from about 40 percent in 1960 to about 20 percent today, whereas, the percentage of the electorate that was self­
identified, evangelical or fundamentalists, had doubled to 25 to 30 percent ofthe electorate. That's a critical mo­
ment in the American history where the evangelical vote becomes more important than the mainline Protestant. It's 
more energetic, it turns out in larger numbers, and of course the critical hard political fact is that it used to be an 
overwhelmingly Democratic constituency. And, of course, today it's overwhelmingly Republican," see, "Church 
and State," Transcript of an Interview ofRalph Reed by David Geren, June 6, 1996, PBS, 
see, http://www . pbs.orglnewshour/ gergen/reed _6-6.html 
33 George W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy ofHistory, translated by J. Sibree (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1991), 
pp. 17,50,74,43-44. 
34 Ibid., p. 86. 
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Hegelobserves that the dialectic of history moves from East to West and, consequently, America 
was a vast empire yet to be realized at the end ofhistory. 
This idea has been recaptured in many respects by Michael Hardt's and Antonio Negri's Empire, 
which identifies the American Revolution "as a moment of great innovation and rupture in the 
genealogy of modem sovereignty.,,35 Instead of the indivisible unity proclaimed by Bodin, 
Grotius, Hobbes, Rousseau and virtually all modem political theorists, the D.S. Founding Fathers 
insisted on the divisibility of sovereignty and thus, according to Hardt and Negri, arrived at the 
idea that "power can be constituted by a whole series of powers that regulate themselves and ar­
range themselves in networks" [i.e., federalism, separation of powers, popular sovereignty].36 
Equally significant to their analysis, is a point so obvious that it has never received much atten­
tion from students of American political thought; namely, that the Founders "'science ofpolitics' 
was also inspired by imperial Rome," which "grounded more solidly the republican process of 
the mediation of social powers and brought it to a conclusion in a synthesis of diverse forms of 
govemments.,,37 Hardt and Negri argue that because ofthe fusion ofrepublicanism and empire in 
the D.S. Constitution "the new D.S. concept of sovereignty opens with extraordinary force to­
ward the outside ... this notion of sovereignty is its tendency toward an open, expansive project 
operating on an unbounded terrain. ,,38 
Hardt's and Negri's most remarkable insight is their observation that the D.S. Constitution - the 
concrete embodiment of the spirit of its people - was designed as an empire, which if combined 
with messianic religious zeal (idea) and an expansive commercial interest provides the synthetic 
Aufhebung for explosive projections of American power when these forces combine at critical 
historical junctures. Anlerican political theorists have published innumerable books and essays 
on the Federalist Papers and the political thought ofthe Founding Fathers, but overlooked in this 
vast literature is that in 1788 The Federalist Papers refer to the Dnited States as an "empire" 
eight separate times in various contexts. These were references to a country with 3 million in­
habitants (compared to Great Britain's 8 million) divided among 13 independent states, which 
were barely held together by a confederate constitution and a central "state" that had no army, no 
navy, was on verge of financial collapse, and potentially on the verge of political dissolution 
within a matter ofmonths. 
35 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 160. 

36 Ibid., p. 162. 

37 Ibid., p. 163. 
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Yet, in the opening paragraph ofFederalist No. 1, Alexander Hamilton observes that in the vote 
to ratify the proposed Constitution, the American people were being called upon to decide "the 
fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world." In Federalist No. 14, 
J ames Madison argues that the ratification votes were to decide whether the inhabitants of the 13 
States were to "be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire." Likewise, in 
Federalist No. 22, Hamilton refers to the "American empire" and still elsewhere he describes the 
United States as "an immense empire" (No. 28) or simply as "the empire" (No. 53). Madison 
also describes the United States as "this great empire" (No. 40). 
At same time, Hamilton chastises leading opponents of the proposed Constitution for flattering 
"themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several 
partial confederacies than from its union under one government" (No. 1) and dismisses "the ideas 
of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire" (No. 13). Upon reviewing the 
Constitution of 1789, Thomas Jefferson, who would later author the document's Bill of Rights, 
wrote: "I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive 
empire and self government. ,,39 
From its founding, the Uni ted States was described as "the empire" and in the Federalist Papers 
the word "empire" appears 35 additional times (beyond those referring to the United States) most 
frequently for purposes of analyzing the strengths of the proposed Constitution based on the suc­
cesses and failures of ancient and modem empires, including the Athenian, Roman, Carthaginian, 
Ottoman, German, and British Empires. Seventeen of these thirty-five additional references to 
empire are to the German Empire, which serves as their model of too little central authority over 
the sovereign states that compose it, while there are thirty-two additional references to the Roman 
Republic (30) and the Roman Empire (2), which as Hardt and Negri point out, serves as the 
Founder's model of a well-balanced and expansive republican empire. 
Yet, what hubris could lead a small group of men, in a largely agrarian society, in a remote part 
of the world to believe that America was an empire? The answer is the form of government both 
existing and proposed for the United States. The state form created by the U.S. Constitution was 
expansive in its design and capacity to absorb new or additional sovereignties into a confederated 
structure that organized a network of sovereignties both horizontally (new States) and vertically 
38 Ibid., p. 165. 
39 See, Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, Empire 01 Liberty: The StatecraJt 01 Thomas Jefferson (Oxford: Ox­
ford University Press, 1990). 
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(federalism). Indeed, the Founding Founders go to great lengths in The Federalist Papers to de­
fend themselves against the charge that their proposed Constitution creates a "national state," but 
instead as Hamilton writes (quoting Montesquieu): 
"'I mean a CONFEDERA TE REPUBLIC. 'This form of government is a convention 
by which several smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which 
they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, 
capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree 
of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body.' The defmition 
of a CONFEDERA TE REPUBLIC seems simply to be 'an assemblage of societies,' 
or an association of two or more states into one state. The extent, modifications, and 
objects ofthe federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate 
organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional 
necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the gen­
eral authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of 
states, or a confederacy" (No. 9).40 
The Constitution of 1789 establishes a form ofpolitical association that is designed for expansion 
and empire by the simple accretion of additional States seeking access to its protection and pros­
perity.41 Indeed, in Federalist No. 43, Madison suggests that the Constitution's provision for 
adding new States is one of its chief strengths, since Madison c1early anticipates the addition of 
"new States" starting with "the Western territory" which "is amine of vast wealth to the United 
States" (Federalist No. 38). Moreover, if this concept of accretion is stretched only minimally 
beyond the written provisions of the Constitution then it is capable of almost endless expansion 
through adjustments in how power is distributed through the various nodes (States) of that net­
work. Thus, Hardt and Negri are correct in their observation that the American form of political 
association was designed as a form of global Empire with no natural limits or boundaries, par­
40 Indeed, in their inaugural and state ofthe union addresses, most V.S. presidents from George Washington until the 
Civil, continued referring to the Vnited States as "the Confederacy." 
41 	 The Founder's understanding of empire is consistent with the contemporary work by historians of international 
relations, who defme an empire as "a major actor in the international system based on the subordination of diverse 
elites who - whether under compulsion or from shared convictions accept the values of those who govern the 
dominant center or metropole." The advantages of being a member state in an empire is that it provides a wider 
"coordination of economic exchange and security guarantees welcomed by its less powerful members states, who 
preserved their autonomy and played a role in collective policymaking," see, Charles S. Maier, "An American 
Empire? The Problems of Frontiers and Peace in Twenty-First Century World Politics," Forum (Novem­
berlDecember 2002): 28-31. (reprinted from Harvard Magazine). 
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ticularly given Hamilton' s flexible interpretation that "the extent, modifications, and objects of 
the federal authority are mere matters of discretion." 
Moreover, the Founders ofthis empire were not subject to the illusion that either republican em­
pires or commercial empires were peaceful by nature. Hamilton explicitly dismisses the notion 
that "the genius of republies (say they) is pacific" or that "the spirit of commerce has a tendency 
to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often 
kindled into wars." He notes, to the contrary, that: 
"Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republies; two of them, Athens and Car­
thage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and de­
fensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times ... and Rome was never sated of 
camage and conquest. Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the 
very war that ended in her destruction" (Federalist No. 6). 
Thus, it is notable that the very first policy recommendation contained in George Washington' s 
first annual address to the U.S. Congress was that 
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"Among the many interesting objects which will engage your attention that of providing 
for the common defense will merit particular regard. To be prepared for war is one ofthe 
most effectual means of preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed, but 
disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite ... ,,42 
In Washington' s address and that of virtually every President thereafter were constant references 
to the depredations of "ho stile tribes of Indians" and reminders "that we ought to be prepared to 
afford protection to those parts of the Vnion [that were subject to attack], and, if necessary, to 
punish aggressors.,,43 After establishing a professional standing army in the Vnited States during 
his tenure, Washington wrote to Congress in his last year ofoffice that V.S. trade to other parts of 
the world: 
"will always be insecure and our citizens exposed to the calamities fron1 which numbers 
of them have but just been relieved. These considerations invite the United States to look 
to the means, and to set about the gradual creation of a navy ... so that a future war of 
Europe may not find our commerce in the same unprotected state in which it was found 
by the present. ,,44 
Quite literally, the first and last policy decisions of America's first president were to establish the 
military foundations of an expanding agrarian-mercantile empire. It is to Hardt's and Negri's 
credit that their analysis of globalization captures this "spirit of empire" in the V.S. Constitution, 
but what is missing in their analysis is the extent to which this conception of empire was also 
fused with a sense of messianic religious destiny that is often described by scholars as America's 
"civil religion." lohn lay, who would become first Chief lustice ofthe V.S. Supreme Court, was 
convinced that "this country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it ap­
pears as if it was the design 01 Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a 
band ofbrethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of 
unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties" (Federalist No. 2, italics added). Likewise, in calling 
upon the people of New York to carefully consider their vote on the proposed Constitution, 
Hamilton observes that: 
42 George Washington, "First Annual Message to Congress," New York City, Federal Hall, Wall & Broad Streets, 
January 8, 1790, 
see, http://odur.1et.rug.n1J-usalP/gwllspeeches/gwsonl.htm 
43 George Washington, "First Annual Message to Congress," New York City, Federal Hall, Wall & Broad Streets, 
January 8, 1790, see, 
http://odur.let.rug.nl/-usa/P/gwl/speeches/gwsonl.htm 
44 George Washington, "Eighth Annual Message to Congress," December 7, 1796, 
see, http://odur.let.rug.n1J-usalP/gwllspeeches/gwson8.htm 
" .. .it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and 
example, to decide the important question, whether societies ofmen are really capable 
or not of establishing good govemment from reflection and choice, or whether they 
are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If 
there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety 
be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of 
the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general mis­
fortune ofmankind" (The Federalist No. 1). 
The imperial Constitution was ratified, of course, and in his last message to Congress in 1796, 
President George Washington reaffirmed the centerpiece of America' s dvil religion by noting 
that: 
"The situation in which I now stand for the last time, in the midst of the representatives of 
the people of the United States, naturally recalls the period when the administration of the 
present form of govemment commenced, and I can not omit the occasion to congratulate 
you and my country on the success of the experiment, nor to repeat my fervent supplica­
tions to the Supreme Ruler of the Universe and Sovereign Arbiter of Nations that His 
providential care may still be extended to the United States, that the virtue and happiness 
of the people may be preserved, and that the Govemment which they have instituted for 
the protection oftheir liberties may be perpetual.,,45 
It should come as no surprise that in his own inaugural address J ohn Adams, the second President 
of the Vnited States (1796-1800), when referring to the Revolution of 1776 invoked the blessing 
of "an overruling Providence which had so signally protected this country from the first. ... And 
may that Being who is supreme over all, the Patron of Order, the Fountain of Justice, and the 
Protector in all ages of the world of virtuous liberty, continue His blessing upon this nation and 
its Government and give it all possible success and duration consistent with the ends of His 
providence.,,46 In comparison to these statements, it can hardly be described as "extreme" or 
"outside the mainstream" of American political culture, when the evangelist Pat Robertson (and 
former V.S. Presidential candidate) declares on television's The 700 Club that the Constitution of 
the United States "is a marvelous document for self-government by the Christian people. But the 
45 George Washington, "Eighth Annual Message to Congress," December 7, 1796, 
see, http://odur.let.rug.nlI-usa/P/gwl/speeches/gwson8.htrn 
46 lohn Adams, "Inaugural Address," 1797, 
see, http://odur.let.rug.nlI-usa/P /ja2/ speeches/inaug 1.htrn 
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minute you turn the document into the hands of non-Christian people and atheistic people [e.g., 
communists] they can use it to destroy the very foundation of our society.,,47 
Hardt and Negri offer a concise and remarkably incisive periodization ofU.S. Constitutional de­
velopment based on the expansion of Empire. They argue that U.S. Constitutional history should 
be divided into four phases or regimes, which each "marks a step toward the realization of impe­
rial sovereignty.,,48 A first phase extends from the Declaration of Independence (1776) to the 
Civil War and Reconstruction (1870), which inc1udes the founding of the empire, most of its ter­
ritorial expansion, and culminates with the establishment of a "real" state (in Hegel' s terms). 49 A 
second "extremely contradictory" phase "straddles the turn of the century" (1890-1920), but be­
gins with Theodore Roosevelt's imperialist doctrine and conc1udes with Woodrow Wilson's mes­
sianic campaign to "make the world safe for democracy." A third phase nloves fronl the N ew 
Deal and the Second World War through the heights ofthe Cold War, while a fourth phase begins 
with the social movements of the 1960s and continues through the dissolution of the Soviet Un­
ion and its Eastern European bloc. While Hardt and Negri are not aware of it, their periodization 
ofU.S. political development and empire overlaps to a remarkable degree with the nation's cyc1e 
of Great Awakenings identified by religious historians, as wen as the periodization of social 
structures of accumulation proposed by radical political economists. 
What is also unfortunate in Hardt's and Negri's analysis is the absence of a single reference to the 
work of Charles A. Beard, whose general history on The Rise 0/ American Civilization would 
have added so much to the historical content of their insight.so Beard's general history was or­
ganized around two theses, which complement and deepen Hardt' s and N egri' s concept of the 
American empire. Beard argues that the United States has always "been a world power, as far as 
has been necessary, from the beginning of our history .... the protection of our govenlffient has 
steadily advanced with the extension of our material interests."Sl Indeed, by 1914, in his Con­
temporary American History, Beard observed "signs that the United States was prepared eco­
47 Pat Robertson on The 700 Club, December 31, 1981, see, http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHi11/7027/quotes.html 

48 Rardt and Negri, Empire, p. 168. 

49 See, Richard BenseI, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in Ameriea, 1859-1877 (Cam­

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
50 Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise ofAmeriean Civilization, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1928). 
51 Charles A. Beard, Ameriean Government and PolWes, 1st edition (New York: Macmillan, 1910), p. 331. 
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nomically to accept that type of imperialism that had long been dominant in British politics and 
had sprung into prominence in Germany, France, and Italy.,,52 
The core of Beard's economic interpretation of American empire was an extension of his dialec­
tical theory ofAmerican political development. Beard conc1uded that, when applied to concrete 
policies, there had always been two competing ideas of national interest associated with the J ef­
fersonian and the Hamiltonian visions. 53 Both visions were fundamentally expansionist in their 
objectives. Going back to the earliest days of the American Republic, the Jeffersonian political 
constituency and its economic concems were essentially agrarian. Their expansionist aims were 
oriented toward the acquisition of land and territory witbin the continental domain of North 
America for the purpose of enlarging a self-sufficient independent agrarian civilization. In fact, 
Beard argues that when the Democratic-Republicans came to power in 1800, its leaders embarked 
on a massive pro gram of territorial expansion that he calls "agricultural imp eriali sm. " 
The central objective of agricultural imperialism was to satisfy the land hunger of agrarian con­
stituents and to thereby strengthen their agrarian social base and promote the agrarian/landed so­
cial structure which J effersonians envisioned as the future of the American republic. The con­
crete results of tbis foreign policy were the Louisiana Purehase (1803), the War of 1812, the 
Florida Purehase (1819), the annexation ofTexas (1845), the Mexican War (1846-1848) and the 
annexation ofthe Califomia and New Mexico Territories, settlement ofthe Northwest Boundary 
Dispute (1846), the Gadsden Purehase (1854), and the Alaska Purehase (1867). Beard concludes 
that after the closing of the frontier in 1893, agricultural imperialism, as such, came to an end, 
i.e., the policy of physical conquest, occupation, and settlement of new lands by Americans was 
exhausted. 
The spirit of empire was realized in America' s westward expansion and as millions of Americans 
acquired land for the first time, their civil religion was reaffirmed by Andrew Jackson and de­
mocratized in the culture of manifest destiny. Andrew Jackson, who nlost symbolized the demo­
cratic revolution in America, affrrmed in bis first inaugural address that: 
52 Charles A. Beard, Contemporary American History, 1877-1913 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1914), p. 202. 
53 See, Clyde W. Barrow, More Than a Historian: The Political and Economic Thought 0/ Charles A. Beard (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2000), Chaps. 3-5. 
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"fIrm reliance on the goodness of that Power whose providence mercifully protected our national 
infancy, and has since upheld our liberties in various vicissitudes, encourages me to offer up my 
ardent supplications that He will continue to make our beloved country the object of His divine 
care and gracious benedic1ion.,,54 
This reaffinnation of civil religion in the era of agricultural imperialism was of course popular­
ized in the 1840s in the concept of "manifest destiny," which seemed to visibly unfold the spirit 
of empire in a relentless westward migration. The phrase manifest destiny was coined by the 
American journalist and diplomat John Louis O'Sullivan in two 1845 editorials in the United 
States Magazine and The Democratic Review, which called for the annexation of Texas.55 In 
framing what one historian calls "the philosophy that created a nation," O'Sullivan wrote that it is 
"the right of our manifest destiny to over spread and to possess the whole of the continent which 
Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federative de­
velopment of self government entrusted to us." He went on to propose that: 
"The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In its magnificent 
domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the ex­
cellence of divine principles; to establish on earth the noblest temple ever dedicated to the wor­
ship of the Most High -- the Sacred and the True. Its floor shall be a hemisphere -- its roof the 
finnament of the star-studded heavens, and its congregation an Union of many Republics, com­
prising hundreds ofhappy millions, calling, owning no man master, but governed by God's natu­
ral and morallaw of equality, the law of brotherhood -- of 'peace and good will amongst men'... 
. Who, then, can doubt that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity?,,56 
The idea of manifest destiny was later used by expansionists in all political parties to justify the 
acquisition of California and the Oregon Territory and by the end of the 19th century the same 
phrase was being used to justify the proposed annexation of various islands in the Caribbean Sea 
54 Andrew Jackson, "First Inaugural Address," delivered Wednesday, March 4, 1829, 
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56 John L, O'Sullivan, The Democratic Review (July/August 1845). In a different version of the same editorial, the 
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and the Pacific Ocean. For example, in referring to the imminent annexation of Texas, while 
building on Madison's idea of an extended confederated republic, President lames Polk pro­
c1aimed "that our system may be safely extended to the utmost bounds of our territorial limits, 
and that as it shall be extended the bonds of our Union, so far from being weakened, will become 
stronger.,,57 
Despite the messianic and self-righteous appeals to Providence, Charles Beard was far from san­
guine about what it had taken to "win the west." Beard suggested that America' s continuous in­
volvement in warf are for purposes of acquiring or defending land -- literally since the time of its 
earliest settlement -- had produced a "war spirit" among the American people that only seemed to 
grow stronger as it was woven into the messianic fabric of American political culture. The west­
ward migration brought human carnage and environmental destruction on a nlassive scale as 
Anlerican settlers moved across successive frontiers like locusts, who stopped only long enough 
to pillage the land and to remove, kill, or marginalize the native inhabitants. Indeed, on the eve 
of W orld War I, Beard lectured student pacifists in his c1asses that "it was an illusion to think of 
Americans as a pacific people; they are and always have been one of the most violent peoples in 
history.,,58 SimilarlY' on the eve of the Second WOrld War, Beard reiterated his claim that war 
has "always been popular in the United States.,,59 Unfortunately, he informed his students, the 
warlike and expansionist thrust of American political culture made it easy for the capitalist and 
political c1asses "to divert the nation's attention from the 'problems ofnationallife' .,,60 
In contrast to the leffersonian agrarians, however, Alexander Hamilton's followers and their eco­
nomic interests were fundamentally commercial in nature. Consequently, Hamiltonians always 
sought access to the overseas carrying trade, to foreign markets as an outlet for manufactured 
goods and, eventually, to opportunities for direct foreign investment of American capital. How­
ever, it was not until after Reconstruction and the end of U.S. territorial acquisition, that the 
United States pursued an aggressive policy to promote full-scale industrialization. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, the United States had become a predominantly industrial nation and, ac­
57 James K. Polk, "Inaugural Address," Tuesday, March 4, 1845, 
see, http://odur.1et.rug.n1IusanewlP /jp l1/speeches/polk.htm 
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cording to Beard, this shift in the national economic base brought with it a change in the domi­
nant foreign policy. In Beard's view, the rise of "industrial imperialism" in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries (phases two to four in Hardt's and Negri's periodization) was pro­
moted by an alliance of manufacturers, traders, ship-owners, financiers, and naval officers.61 
Although the historical foundations of industrial imperialism could be traced back to the Hamil­
tonian system ofprotectionism and a strong navy, it achieved dominance as a foreign policy only 
during the 1890s under the Presidency ofWilliam McKinley with strong support fronl individuals 
like Theodore Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary ofthe Navy, and Albert J. Beveridge, a leading 
U.S. Senator. 
On the cusp of the Spanish-American War, newly elected President William McKinley shifted 
American foreign policy toward the new era of commercial imperialism by virtually echoing the 
now ancient words ofGovemor John Winthrop. In his inaugural address, McKinley declared that: 
"Our faith teaches that there is no safer reliance than upon the God of our fathers, who has so sin­
gularly favored the American people in every national trial, and who will not forsake us so long 
as we obey His commandments and walk humbly in His footsteps.,,62 However, in what must be 
one of the most belligerent screeds in U.S. history, Senator Albert J. Beveridge gave prominent 
expression to the new imperialism in an 1898 campaign speech entitled, "On the New American 
Empire":63 
"IT IS A NOBLE LAND that God has given us; aland that can feed and clothe the 
world .. .It is a mighty people that He has planted on this soil; a people sprung from the 
most masterful blood of history ... .It is a glorious history our God has bestowed upon His 
chosen people ... a history heroic with faith in our mission and our future; a history of 
statesmen who flung the boundaries of the republic out into unexplored lands and savage 
wildernesses; a history of soldiers who carried the flag across the blazing deserts and 
through the ranks of hostile mountains, even to the gates of sunset; a history of a multi­
plying people who overran a continent in half a century ... a history divinely logical. ... .It is 
a world question Shall the American people continue their resistless march toward the 
commercial supremacy of the world? ..And shall we reap the reward that waits on our dis­
charge of our high duty as the sovereign power of earth .... But a war has marked it, the 
61 Fred Harvey Harrington, "Beard's Idea of National Interest and New Interpretations," American Perspective 4 
(1950), p. 336. 
62 William McKinley, "First Inaugural Address," Thursday, March 4, 1897, 
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most holy ever waged by one nation against another--a war for civilization, a war for a 
permanent peace, a war which, under God, although we knew it not, swung open to the 
republic the portals of the commerce of the world ... .It means all this tomorrow, and all 
this forever, because it means not only the trade of the prize provinces but the beginning 
of the commercial empire of the republic ... .It is the tide of God's great purposes made 
manifest in the instincts of our race, whose present phase is our personal profit, but whose 
far-off end is the redemption of the world and the Christianization of mankind .... Fellow 
Americans, we are God's chosen people" 64 
However, as a late entrant onto the world stage of imperialism, the Vnited States encountered a 
world that had been conquered already and divided among the European powers and, as a conse­
quence, it was forced to abandon the policy of overt territorial acquisition for an exceptional pol­
icy ofneo-imperialism. For Beard, the exceptional features of America's commercial imperialism 
were defined by three characteristics. First, it was based on controlling sea lanes, rather than ter­
ritories. Beard traced the historical origins of this strategy to Commodore Perry, the first naval 
officer to publicly advocate a policy of imperialisnl and to act on it independently by opening Ja­
pan to American trading vessels (1854). Almost two decades later, Admiral Meade, again acting 
on his own authority seized Tutuila (Samoa) and negotiated a treaty for a naval base that gave the 
V.S. Navy an advance position in the South Pacific. However, Beard considered Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, also a naval officer, as the individual who did most to sell the idea of sea power and em­
pire to the V.S. President and Congress. Acting under the spell ofthe so-called Mahan thesis, the 
Vnited States asserted its strategic control of important sea lanes in the Spanish-American War 
(1898), particularly in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Basin, by taking control of Hawaii, 
the Philippines, Guam, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. These two American lakes were then joined stra­
tegically by taking over and completing the Panama Canal project (1904), which required the 
United States' first involvement in a covert operation to separate Panama from Columbia.65 The 
63 Albert J. Beveridge, "On the New American Empire; a speech delivered in Indianapolis, Indiana, on September 16, 
1898," Annals 0/America, Vol. 12 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1968), pp. 198-202. 
64 Albert J. Beveridge, "On the New American Empire; a speech delivered in Indianapolis, Indiana, on September 16, 
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Mahan strategy was explicitly resurrected by President Ronald Reagan with his commitment to 
rebuilding America's post-Vietnam military strength around a 600 ship navy. 
The open door policy was a second characteristic of America' s exceptional imperialism. Rather 
than seeking to monopolize access to colonial markets, America' s late entry onto the world stage 
placed it in the position of seeking to open foreign markets to free and fair competition with its 
European rivals. Beard often claimed that this exceptional strategy also reinforced the habitually 
moralistic overtones of American imperialism, because it allowed V.S. leaders to play the role of 
world liberator, i.e., freeing colonies from European masters (e.g., Cuba, Philippines) and do­
mestic dictators (e.g., Panama). This allowed American statesmen and corporate elites to conceal 
their economic and political ainls behind populist rhetoric such as "nlaking the world safe for 
democracy," while the domination of foreign economies through direct investment and foreign 
loans could be presented under the ideological rubric ofdevelopment aid and assistance.66 
In this manner, the interests of the Vnited States are carried by business corporations into places 
where the possibility of actually defending such rights is remote, or where doing so inevitably 
requires the use of military force and persistent police actions throughout the world. Indeed, 
capital exports and the penetration of foreign markets had effectively extended the Fifth Amend­
ment and the obligation of contract clause "to ships upon the high seas; commodities in ware­
houses and shops abroad; capital invested; mines, factories, and other plants owned in part or 
wholly by American citizens or corporations; concessions already won and in process of winning; 
lands, forests, houses, and other property owned in foreign places by American citizens and cor­
porations; overseas possessions, protectorates, and spheres of influence and penetration against 
foreign governments; and similar rights, titles, and privileges in esse or in posse." Significantly, 
Beard found that "in promoting and defending the national interest so conceived" interested par­
ties expect the American state to employ all the engines of State to protect their interests and de­
spite verbal concessions to peace, the final sanction of American activities abroad remains the 
V.S. Navy.67 
Third, the opening of markets to non-colonial entrants paradoxically provided the earlY founda­
tions for American neo-imperialism (i.e., dollar diplomacy) through foreign direct investment and 
foreign loans, which began in the 1890s as Great Britain and Spain were pushed from Latin 
66 Martin J. Sklar, The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in USO History in the Progressive Era and the 
1920s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Chap. 3. 
67 Charles A. Beard, The Open Door at Horne (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 40-43. 
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America. By re1ying on capita1 investment rather than military occupation as a strategy of territo­
rial and economic penetration, Beard emphasized that American "imperia1ism does not rest pri­
mari1y upon adesire for more territory, but rather upon the necessity for markets in which to sell 
manufactured goods and for opportunities to invest surplus accumulations of capital." Hence, the 
chief prerequisite of the American form of imperialism "is not the annexation of co10nies, but 
'free trade' and security of direct foreign investments, and the ability to repatriate profits.,,68 The 
current phase of economic globalization and its attendant network of confederated regulatory in­
stitutions is simply a continuation, ifnot a culmination, of this strategy ofAmerican empire. 
At the same time, this three-pronged neo-imperialist strategy has enab1ed V.S. foreign po1icy­
makers to position the Vnited States as a "leader of the free world" by protecting and policing sea 
lanes from control and domination by expansionist powers; to claim that it was 1iberating sub­
jected peoples from control by European or other despotie powers; and to insist that it was in­
vesting in the economic future of 1ess deve10ped countries, rather than exp10iting them or ren­
dering thenldependent on V.S. economic, financial, and military power. To this extent, V.S. im­
perialism has always been a J anus that appears menacing and deadly to its victims and competi­
tors, but benign and generous to the American public. 
However, these imperial thrusts tend to occur when the configuration of economic, political, and 
cu1tural forces is synchronized so that a triggering event sets in motion a violent outward projec­
tion of American power that allow Americans initiate offensive actions under the rubric of "na­
tional defense." The American Revolution is triggered by the Stamp Act and the "Intolerable 
Acts." The War of 1812 is ostensibly to stop the impress ofV.S. sailors by the British navy. The 
acquisition of Florida (1819) occurs after Andrew Jackson invades it to "protect" V.S. citizens 
settling illegally in Spanish territory. The Mexican War begins after V.S. troops are attacked 
while illegally occupying Mexican territory (southem Texas) ostensibly to protect "American" 
citizens. The Spanish-American War (1898) begins after an explosion of unknown origins sinks 
the V.S.S. Maine in Havana Harbor. The Vnited States mobilizes for World War I after the 
sinking of the Lusitania, whi1e more recently Pearl Harbor, the Gu1f of Tonkin, the World Trade 
Towers, and many more incidents have provided the short-term rationale for war. Some of the 
incidents are real, whi1e others are fabricated or exaggerated misrepresentations of reality. 
Beard's concept of a triggering event was not meant to suggest that V.S. Presidents deliberately 
68 Beard, Contemporary American History, pp. 202, 224. 
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plunge the country into wars simply to divert attention from economic crisis or the failure to 
achieve promised social refornlS. hlstead, it was to point out that in international relations inci­
dents and provocations are an almost daily occurrence so that any govemment can quickly mag­
nify one ofthem into ajust cause for war.69 
The most recent imperial proj ect was launched during the Reagan Revolution and it too has oc­
curred at a time when economic crisis, political messianism, and religious awakening have inter­
sected as a synchronized social force to both stimulate and legitimate a global imperial thrust. 
The political crystallization of these synchronized forces began to appear in a 1982 preview of 
President Ronald Reagan's "evil empire" speech, where he renewed the "special relationship" 
between Great Britain and the United States by announcing that "the emergency is upon us." 
Re ag an announced "a crusade for freedom" and a "global campaign for democracy" that would 
establish the "conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries." He 
appealed for the aide of Great Britain in particular because it was "the cradle of self-govemment" 
and the origin of "the great civilized ideas: individualliberty, representative govemment, and the 
rule oflaw under God.,,70 
The following year, Reagan developed these ideas further in his globally publicized evil empire 
speech delivered at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals. hl this 
speech, Reagan emphasized that the crusade for freedonl could not be reduced to an economic 
struggle between capitalism and communism, nor viewed only as a political struggle between 
democracy and totalitarianism, since "the basis of those ideals and principles ... is grounded in the 
much deeper realization that freedom prospers only where the blessings of God are avidly sought 
and humbly accepted." He claimed that "the Anlerican experiment in denlocracy rests on this 
insight." He pointed to the fact that "the Declaration of Independence mentions the Supreme Be­
ing no less that four times," while '''In God We Trust' is engraved on our coinage. The Supreme 
Court opens it proceedings with a religious invocation. And the members of Congress open their 
sessions with a prayer." 71 
69 Charles A. Beard, "National Politics and War," Scribner's Magazine 97 (February 1935): 65-70. 
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In the Evil Empire Speech, Reagan reaffirmed the American covenant by declaring "war against 
communism not simply [on the basis] that it was an alternative economic and political system, 
but because it posed a fundamental threat to Christianity" and "we will never abandon our belief 
in God." Thus, the Reagan Revolution was not only a war for capitalism and democracy; it was a 
struggle against "the aggressive impulses of an evil empire ... the struggle between right and 
wrong and good and evil." 72 When having won the war against the evil of a godless Commu­
nism, the inauguration of George H. Bush continued the long tradition of American civil religion 
by calling attention to the fact that "I have just repeated word for word the oath taken by George 
Washington 200 years ago, and the Bible on which I placed my hand is the Bible on which he 
placed his .... my first act as President is a prayer.,,73 
Thus, in responding to an incident that shocked the faith and confidence of the American people 
on September 11, 2001, it was hardly idiosyncratic that his son, President George W. Bush, 
would continue the crusade for Christianity and capitalism with the announcement that "our re­
sponsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.,,74 In the 
year leading up to the U.S.-Iraq War, Bush described the state ofthe union in the following way: 
"Deep in the American character, there is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism. And 
many have discovered again that even in tragedy - especially in tragedy -- God is near. In 
a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history ofliberty, that 
we've been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced a choice 
more c1ear or consequential. .. We stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the day 
ofour founding. We affmn it again today.,,75 
4. The Logic of Capital Accumulation 
It is hardly peculiar to observe that the Keynesian Welfare State, as a particular social structure of 
accumulation, organized class relations and capital accumulation in the United States from ap­
72 Ronald Reagan "The Evil Empire Speech," Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of 
Evangelicals Orlando, Florida March 8, 1983, 
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proximately 1940 to 1979. The economic and political "contradictions" in this SSA begin to un­
ravel from 1966 (Vietnam War) to 1979 (2nd Oil Crisis) and IT finally collapsed during the 1980s 
when a new business ascendancy successfully "rolled back" the welfare state in domestic policy, 
while reinvigorating American economic and military hegemony on aglobaI scale.76 
A central principle of SSA theory is that as the structural fonn of capital accumulation changes 
(e.g., from competitive to corporate), the "non-economic" or superstructural institutions that once 
supported and reinforced capital accumulation and class hegemony eventually become fetters on 
the process of capitalist development. This neo-Marxian or post-Marxian theory emphasizes that 
capital accumulation is supported by a range of other institutions, including taxation, tariffs, pub­
lic education, transportation infrastructure, central banking and currency institutions, property 
law, contract law, etc. When these institutions support capital fonnation and facilitate economic 
growth, there is a long-wave of expansion as capitalists gain confidence in the system and begin 
to invest in the economy. As the economy undergoes technological or other changes, the earlier 
SSA either loses its economic effectiveness or politicallegitimacy, which leads to declining busi­
ness confidence and investment. 
This contradiction between the forces and relations of production results in a "accumulation cri­
sis" that is always the prelude to a transition from one SSA to another.77 Thus, SSA theory ex­
plains accunlulation crises as the structural effect of an emerging disjuncture between the chang­
ing requirements of capital accumulation and the organization, institutions, and policies that fa­
cilitate accumulation in conjunction with the state and ideological apparatuses. In this context, 
newly ascendant fractions of the capitalist class find that social institutions (e.g., the family), 
cultural orientations (e.g., consumer preferences), governmental institutions (e.g., law, foreign 
policy), and educational policies (e.g., curricula) must all be comprehensively reconstructed to 
reestablish the functional integration of the capitalist system and, thereby, catalyze a new long­
76 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, The Breaking of the American Social Compact (New York: New 
Press, 1997); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, The New Class War: Reagan's Attack on the Welfare 
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wave of economic growth. Business leaders must therefore initiate movements to redesign cul­
tural, political, and social institutions to create a new social structure of capital accumulation.78 
The outcome of each major accumulation crisis is not merely a "recovery" period in the business 
cyc1e, but a fundamental restructuring of the economic, ideological, and political relations that 
constitute capitalist society. Historically, most SSA theorists have argued that specific social 
structures of accumulation exist as approximately 50-year periods of growth and dec1ine, while 
all agree that United States capitalism entered an accumulation crisis in the mid- to late 1970's. 
This accumulation crisis required a fundamental reconstruction of the political and social institu­
tions of American capitalism, inc1uding the international configuration of American global he­
gemony. 
A common feature of capitalist states is their tendency to institutionalize a hierarchical and hori­
zontal distribution of state power (e.g., federalism and separation of powers) so that the various 
levels and branches of the state apparatus institutionalize "differential access to the state appara­
tuses and differential opportunities to realize specific effects in the course of state intervention.,,79 
State power is institutionalized asymmetrically through the state apparatus to the extent that each 
level or branch of an apparatus constitutes the major power base of contending c1asses and c1ass 
fractions within the state.80 
Following World War 11, the hegemony of American finance-capital was institutionalized in a 
state-capitalist form of accumulation. It should be emphasized that in this context, the concept of 
finance capital does not refer exc1usively to persons or institutions in the financial sector, but 
designates the asymmetrical balance of power between interlocking financial and non-financial 
sectors ofthe monopoly capital. This state-capitalist social structure of accumulation - frequently 
called the Keynesian Welfare State -- was structured, first, on a partnership between govemment 
and nlonopoly capital (e.g., tariff protection and subsidies) and, second, on aseries of "historic 
accords" or c1ass compromises embodied in institutions such as collective bargaining, the mini­
mum wage, social security, unemployment insurance, and other labor protections that were rarely 
extended beyond the monopoly sector in the United States.81 
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This social structure of accumulation and its state form collapsed in the Vnited States between 
1973 and 1979 for three reasons: (1) the profits-squeeze generated by the success of working 
dass struggle under the Keynesian Welfare State, (2) the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, and 
(3) the unforeseen impact of economic globalization on the domestic V.S. economy. A great deal 
has been written about the first two events, which led the hegemonic fraction of finance capital to 
become increasingly restless with the historic accords that structured the Keynesian Welfare 
State. However, I want to suggest that it was the unforeseen impact of economic globalization ­
largely a strategic miscalculation by monopoly capital -- that was the final blow to the old social 
structure of accumulation and one that propelled the dominant capitalist fraction to reconstitute 
itself on an even more globally oriented basis. 
At the end of World War II, the Council on Foreign Relations, the leading corporate liberal for­
eign policy organization, was long convinced of both the economic and political advantages of 
free trade. It was a vehide for satisfying mass consumer preferences in the V.S. at low prices, a 
way to contain or isolate Soviet influence, and a way to attach Europe and the developing coun­
tries to the V.S. sphere of economic and political influence.82 Following World WarlI, the V.S. 
economy accounted for 45% ofworld gross domestic product and as Christoph Scherrer observes 
the United States was able to exercise "its economic hegemony notably by opening its own mar­
ket." 83 Access to the V.S. domestic market is highly coveted by companies in Germany, Japan, 
South Korea, and many other nations that have built export-based economies in the post-war pe­
riod that are highly dependent on access to V.S. markets. 
Moreover, the post-war opening of the V.S. market was a major catalyst to the process of eco­
nomic globalization and, in this respect, it should be emphasized that globalization is not a tech­
nologically determined event, but a policy process and a process of new institution building that 
is creating a new social structure of accumulation. From the V.S. perspective, three key events in 
this process were the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement, the Kennedy Round (1963­
1967) ofthe GATT, and the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) ofthe GATT negotiations. The financial 
sector ofthe V.S. finance capital bloc has fared quite well over the long-run from the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and regulated capital flows. The new sys­
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man, Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Frank Deppe, eds., The Emergence ofa New Euro Capitalism?: Implicationsfor Analy­
sis and Politics (Marburg, Germany: Forschungsgruppe Europäische Gemeinschaft (FEG), 2003). 
38 Clyde W. Barrow 
tem offloating exchange rates, combined with the supremacy ofthe V.S. dollar have placed Wall 
Street financial finns, the V.S. Federal Reserve, and the V.S. Treasury at the center of a new 
global financial network that is also closely linked to the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, where the Vnited States govemment continues to exercise considerable leverage.84 
for this reason, Christoph Sherrer argues that "the liberal world-market order of the post-war era 
may be interpreted as a project of internationally-oriented capital fractions in the Vnited States 
(notably New York banks and law practices as well as transnational corporations from the various 
sectors). These fractions succeeded in hegemonically integrating into their project important 
groups in the Vnited States on the one hand, and --- through the resources of the VS govemment 
- the other capitalist industrial nations on the other.,,85 
However, the resurgent global hegemony of the V.S. financial sector stands in sharp contrast to 
the fate of the "old" industrial sector that had previously constituted the "junior partner" in the 
hegemonie bloc that constituted finance capital. The international protections long enjoyed by 
this state-monopoly sector were severely eroded by the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, which re­
sulted in significant tariffreductions and the easing ofnon-tariffbarriers. However, as Stan Luger 
demonstrates in his analysis of the V.S. automobile industry, executives in the monopoly­
industrial sector had grown highly arrogant and con1placent about their position in the V.S. do­
mestic market. 86 They soon discovered that V.S. industry dominated its own domestic market be­
cause it was heavily protected against international competition (i.e., tariffs, quotas, and technical 
standards) and the recipient of indirect state subsidies (e.g., tax treatment), which had allowed 
these sectors to become highly inefficient, non-innovative, or sub-standard in quality by interna­
tional standards. This sector of the finance capital bloc was simply unprepared to face real com­
petition on aglobai scale. This situation was most visible in the United States' deteriorating bal­
ance oftrade in goods, which first tumed negative in 1971 and has recorded a deficit every year 
since 1976. 
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In contrast, fi.rms based in the export-driven economies of Germany and Japan were in a much 
better position to compete in those sectors as they rapid1y penetrated V.S. markets for automo­
biles, stee1, textile machinery, and consumer e1ectronics, among others. The textile and appare1 
industries rapid1y also lost market share to firms in East and South Asia despite continuing pro­
tections. The shock effect on the industrial sector had two significant repercussions po1itically. 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, V.S. corporations 1aunched a massive new business mobi1ization 
that was signa1ed by the creation of the V.S. Business Roundtab1e (1975), the reinvigoration of 
groups 1ike the Committee for Economic Deve10pment, and a massive infusion of new money 
into po1itica1 campaigns made possib1e by the passage of the Federa1 E1ection Campaign Acts of 
1971 and 1974.87 
The most visible consequence of the new business mobi1ization was Rona1d Re ag an , s e1ection in 
1980 on a p1atform that promised to roll back the welfare state and return the country to tradi­
tiona1 American va1ues; thus unifying the corporate establishment and the new Christian Right in 
a mutual economic-cultura1 assault on the Keynesian We1fare State. The Presidentia1 administra­
tions ofRona1d Re ag an (1980-1988) and George H. Bush (1988-1992) were broad1y comnlitted 
to a set of po1icies that sought to stimu1ate new private investment in the V.S. economy and to 
minimize the ro1e of government in economic regulation and the provision of socia1 welfare. 
The short-term impact of the Reagan Revolution was seven years (1983-1990) of virtually unin­
terrupted economic growth (recession in 1981-82 and again 1990-91) and an increase in the GDP 
from $4 trillion to $5 trillion dollars (although real median househo1d income dec1ined for most 
Americans). Vnemp10yment fell from more than 11% in 1981 to 5.2% prior to the 1990-91 reces­
sion. Inflation dec1ined from 11 % in 1981 into a 2% to 3% range by 1990. Factory capacity utili­
zation rose from 70% to 84% during the same period. Thus, using basic measures such as GDP 
growth, unemp10yment rates, inflation rates, and capacity uti1ization, the Reagan Revolution was 
high1y successfu1 in achieving its stated economic objectives, particu1ar1y considering that union 
density also dec1ined from 23.3% ofthe total V.S. workforce in 1983 to 18.3% in 1990,88 whi1e 
87 Thomas Byrne Edsall, The New Politics oflnequality (New York: W.W. Norton, Inc., 1984). 
88 V.S. Department ofCommerce, Bureau ofthe Census, Statistical Abstract ofthe United States: 200, 122nd Edition 
(Austin, Texas: Hoover's Business Press, 2002), Tab1e No. 628, p. 411. 
40 Clyde W. Barrow 
the distribution ofwealth and income reached unprecedented levels of inequality due to a massive 
redistribution of income from labor to capital engineered by the Reagan tax cuts of 1981-84.89 
While the domestic policies ofthe U.S. Keynesian Welfare State were explicitly designed to de­
flect socialism in the United States,90 its post-war foreign policy was explicitly designed to con­
tain Communism (Truman Doctrine). The aggressive neo-conservative agenda advanced by 
Reagan' s election was not only based on a commitment to roll back the welfare state, but a com­
mitment to rollback "the evil Empire" and to defeat Communism. This strategy involved un­
precedented "peacetime" military expenditures and covert engagements throughout the world. By 
the end of George H. Bush's term as President, Communist regimes and insurgency had been 
eliminated throughout Latin America (excepting Cuba), China and Vietnam were liberalizing for­
eign investment rules and reintroducing markets, the Berlin Wall had fallen, and the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe were engaged in a transition to capitalism. 
However, a second political effect of industrial sector' s deterioration was a growing perception 
among econonlic, political, and intellectual elites that Gernlany and Japan were again emerging 
as the respective centers of European and Asia-Pacific regional economic blocs capable of chal­
lenging U.S. economic dominance.91 By 1990, the U.S. economy was only 22% of gross world 
product compared to 45% in 1946. More notably, Japan and the European Union (EU) were cap­
turing larger shares ofthe world market for high technology and medium technology and had be­
gun to penetrate the U.S. domestic market in these sectors.92 Thus, in reaction to a perceived 
movement toward "c1osed regionalism" by Europe and Japan, as well as the developing countries 
of Africa and Latin America (e.g., Mercosur, SADC), the hegemonic fraction ofAmerican capital 
was again forced to turn outward by promoting GATT's Uruguay Round (1987-1994), which not 
only lowered average tariffs in the advanced industrial countries, but widened the scope of liber­
alization to trade in services, while expanding the WTO's coverage to 144 of the world's 190 
countries. 
89 	Robert B. Avery and Gregory E. Elliehausen, "Financial Characteristics of High Income Families," Federal Re­
serve Bulletin 72, No. 3 (March 1986): 163-77; Robert S. McIntyre and David Wilhelm, Money lor Nothing: The 
Failure olCorporate Tax Incentives, 1981-1984 (Washington, D.C.: Citizens for Tax Justice, 1986). 
90 James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). 

91 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage ofNations (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Robert B. Reich, The 

Work 01 Nations: Preparing Ourselves lor 2Ft-Century Capitalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1992); Lester 
Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America (New York: William 
Morrow and Co., 1992). 
92 Sylvia Ostry, "Technology Issues in the International Trading System." Pp. 145-70 in OECD, Market Access After 
the Uruguay Round: Investment, Competition and Technology Perspectives (Paris, 1996). 
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However, it is one thing to dismantle a social structure of accumulation; it requires far more vi­
sion to build a new one. While the Reaganauts were largely self-satisfied with restoration of lais­
sez-faire policies and continually diverted popular attention from their domestic policies with 
military adventures, the resurgent bloc of newly internationalized finance capitalists were by no 
means convinced that the United States was in a position to maintain either its economic or po­
litical hegemony in the context of economic globalization. The power bloc of corporate liberal 
finance capitalists was finally fractured and reconstituted as U.S. industrial firn1s collapsed, pur­
sued international mergers and trans-nationalization, reconstituted their technological base, or 
were replaced in the bloc by newly emergent high technology and service firms. 
By the early 1990s, finance capitalists, academics, and many govemment officials, had concluded 
that the U.S. economic base would have to be reconstituted to compete primarily in the more ad­
vanced "post-industrial" sectors of the global economy, such as high technology, financial serv­
ices, and professional services, where U.S.-based companies could still maintain a competitive 
advantage. Thus, the strategic objective of U.S. competitiveness strategies has been to facilitate 
and support the continued development of domestic high-wage sectors such as financial, profes­
sional, and business services and advanced technology in telecommunications and information 
processing, computer-assisted manufacturing, and other high technology industries. 
A historic shift in this direction was signaled by Bill Clinton's election in 1992, which was the 
first national victory for the self-proclaimed "New Democrats," whose ideologicallineage origi­
nates in the "Atari Democrats" of the late 1970s, and who were so designated because of their 
antipathy to trade unions, their receptiveness to proposals for social spending reductions, and 
their beliefthat the future ofthe U.S. economy depended on the expansion ofthe high technology 
and professional service sectors. Thus, when Clinton was elected U.S. President in 1992, the new 
administration openly distanced itselffrom the state-centered policies ofthe Keynesian New Deal 
liberals by referring to themselves as "New Democrats" committed to a peculiarly American 
philosophy of "neo-liberalism.,,93 While American neo-liberals have often proclaimed the "new­
ness" oftheir economic philosophy, in practice the Clinton Administration largely continued and 
93 The term neo-liberal is employed in its contemporary "American" usage, rather than its classical "European" 
meaning. See Dolbeare and Medcalf (1993, 72-83) who defme neo-liberalism in its American usage as an ideo­
logical orientation that seeks to promote social justice and equity through state action while accepting the principle 
that such policies depend on the expansion and profitability of the private sector. Unlike neo-conservatives who 
advocate a laissez-faire economic policy or socialists who advocate public and social ownership of the means of 
production, neo-liberals advocate astate "industrial policy" organized through government-business partnerships. 
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built upon the bi-partisan policies established during the first Bush Administration. These policies 
included fiscal restraint and trade liberalization (NAFTA and WTO), 
The net result of these cumulative developments is that the United States has emerged from the 
last three decades of economic and social turmoil as an American superstate that is by "far and 
away the most powerful country in the world, with no serious rivals in the economic, political, or 
military realms.,,94 By 1997, the J apanese and German economies combined were only 56 percent 
as large as the U.S. economy, while the Japanese, German, British, and French economies com­
bined were still only 87% as large as the U.S. economy.95 During the 1990s, a ten-year cycle of 
uninterrupted productivity and GDP growth actually widened the economic gap between the 
United States, Europe, and the rest of the world as the rate of U.S. economic growth exceeded 
both the European and the world average.96 In fact, from 1990 to 1998, the United States reversed 
a four-decades long trend of its economy shrinking as a share of world gross domestic product so 
that during this time the U.S. econonlY not only grew in absolute terms - to a currently $11 tril­
lion gross domestic product (2002) - it increased proportionately from 22 percent to 25 percent of 
world gross domestic product. 97 
Indeed, economic globalization and its auxiliary supra-national institutions are largely extensions 
ofthe intemationalization ofU.S. capital accumulation, and to a lesser degree ofEurope and Ja­
pan, and may certainly be viewed as a new phase of neo-imperialism. In this respect, the "new" 
world order is an excrescence ofthe American superstate, and its junior partners, and it is the cur­
rent state form in which American hegemony has been reconstituted and reproduced on aglobai 
scale. Gindin and Panitch conclude that "recent tensions between Europe and the United States 
[e.g., Iraq, punitive tariffs] revolve around the role of the American state as acting on behalf of 
the particular interests of American capital as opposed to acting in the interests of global capital; 
and, in broader terms, acting as the embodiment of an all-too-often chauvinist definition of 
American national interests as opposed to the larger neo-imperial interest.,,98 Even Martin Shaw, 
a leading proponent ofthe global state thesis, acknowledges that "for most sections ofthe Ameri­
94 Ibid., p. 298. 
95 G. William Domhoff, Who Rules Ameriea? Power and Polities in the Year 2000, 3rd Edition (Mountain View, 
California: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 298-99. 
96 Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, "Euro-Capitalism and American Imperialism," Pp. 72-98 in Martin Beckman, Hans­
Jürgen Bieling, and Frank Deppe, eds., The Emergenee ofa New Euro Capitalism? Implieations for Analysis and 
Polities (Marburg, Germany: Forschungsgruppe Europäische Gemeinschaft (FEG), 2003), pp. 81-91 for a review 
ofindicators documenting the resurgence ofU.S. economic strength and comparative advantage in the 1990s. 
97 World Bank, 1999 World Development Indieators (Washington, D. C.: W orId Bank, 1999). 
98 Panitch and Gindin, "Euro-Capitalism and American Imperialism," p. 95. 
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can power elite, world politics are still primarily understood in terms of its 'national' interest; 
common Western and global interests are subsumed into it. The 'international community' is seen 
to a considerable extent as an adjunct ofAmerican policy, not the other way round.,,99 
Insofar as the role of the state is to organize the interests of capital as a whole, the American su­
perstate's current imperial project is a significant failure to realize to those interests on a global 
scale. However, at the turn of the century, V.S. military expenditures were nearly double those of 
Japan, Germany, France, and the Vnited Kingdom combined and were nearly equal to the mili­
tary expenditures of the rest of the entire world combined and this rate of military spending was 
achieved by committing only 4 percent of V.S. G.D.P. to these expenditures (which is less than 
the 6% to 7% committed during the Cold War).100 Moreover, these expenditures do not even be­
gin to capture the immense technological gap between the Vnited States and any potential mili­
tary competitors. Thus, Domhoff concludes that "the most likely result of this unrivaled power is 
that the American foreign policy establishment will intervene militarily anywhere in the world 
that it chooses" to protect "American" interests.101 The only foreseeable limit to this economic 
and military power will be the internal contradictions of the hegemonie bloc and the tendency of 
messianie state elites to over-reach until disciplined by some disastrous military adventure. This 
latter scenario has been predicted (incorrect1y thus far) in every V.S. military expedition from 
Haiti to Kosovo to the 2nd Gulf(U.S.-Iraq) War. 
5. The End of a Messianic Era 
The messianie component of the American ideology inherently goes beyond the immediate eco­
nomic interests of American capital as weIl as the political interest in defending democracy 
against totalitarian regimes elsewhere in the world. This ideology is prone to carry both state 
elites and the popular multitude beyond the rational limits of Realpolitik and capital accumula­
tion. The American social formation and its state are thus periodically "over-determined" at the 
ideological level, while the logic of empire designed into the V.S. Constitution facilitates this 
overdetermination with remarkable effectiveness. Yet, it is worth noting that the country's major 
international wars tend to come at the end ofmessianie eras and bring them to a elose, rather than 
99 Martin Shaw, Theory ofthe Global State: Globality as Unfinished Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p. 246. 
100 G. WilliamDomhoff, Who Rules America?, pp. 298-99; Shaw, Theory ofthe Global State, pp. 204-05. 
101 Domhoff, Who Rules America?, pp. 299. 
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begin them, and here too a pattern emerges that explains this phenomenon in the exhaustion (or 
completion) of cycles. 
First, it is worth observing that in an open letter to his friends, which was followed by an inter­
view in the Los Angeles Times and an essay in the Washington Post, Paul Weyrich, an architect 
ofthe New Right's political strategy and president ofthe Free Congress Foundation, issued what 
one author has described as a jeremiad against the cultural decline of the American people. He 
noted correctly that conservatives had leamed to win elections, but had never managed to enact 
their domestic social agenda. Weyrich argues that "politics has failed" and that the Christian 
Coalition has achieved little of its moral agenda, nlainly because most Americans actually do not 
embrace their culture war. 102 He concludes at the beginning ofthe twenty-first century that poli­
tics has failed because of the collapse of American culture, which he describes as "an ever-wider 
sewer ... a cultural collapse of historic proportions, a collapse so great that it simply overwhelms 
politics.,,103 
Thus, Weyrich and his followers now favor a non-political direct action strategy called "separa­
tion," which is quite typical of the final phase in Great Awakenings, when they exhaust their po­
litical fervor and turn inward toward the development of "parallel institutions" such as horne 
schools or Christian schools.104 Indeed, as an organization, the Moral Majority came to an end in 
1989, when the Reverend Jerry Falwell officially disbanded it. The Christian Coalition had to se­
lect its third president in only a decade after Pat Robertson' s dismal showing in the 1992 Repub­
lican party primaries, followed by Ralph Reed's departure and integration into the mainstream 
corporate-Republican establishment. The evangelist Oral Roberts, like other university presi­
dents, is now mainly concerned about the fiscal stability of Oral Roberts University in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma even to the extent that his webpage now primarily emphasizes fundraising for univer­
sity scholarships, rather than a sweeping political or moral agenda. Similarly, after disbanding 
the Moral Majority, Jerry Falwell also tumed his attention to expanding Liberty University in 
Lynchburg, Virginia, which though it is still an important campaign stop in the Republic party's 
102 Charles R. Kesler, "The End ofthe Moral Majority," see, http://www.elaremont.org/writings/990401kesler.html. 
Artiele appeared originally in the April 1, 1999 online magazine IntellectualCapital.com 
103 Sara Fritz, "Culture Warrior Cireles the Wagons in Wake ofReligious Right's Defeat: Interview with Paul Wey 
rich," Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1999, p. 3; Paul Weyrich, "Separate and Free," Washington Post, March 7, 
1999, p. B-7. 
104 For example, see, Donald George Tewksbury, The Founding ofAmerican Colleges and Universities Before the 
Civil War, with particular reference to the religious influences bearing upon the college movement (Hamden, 
Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965 [1932], where the second Great Awakening came to a elose in the denomina­
tional college movement. 
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V.S. Presidential primary, Falwell has generally withdrawn from politics. Other evangelists of 
the Fourth Great Awakening have made less salutary exits from the national scene, including 
Jimmy Swaggart, who was discredited by a sex scandal followed by a well choreographed na­
tional television appearance where he said: "Forgive me Lord for I have sinned!" Jim and 
Tammy Faye Baker each served prison time for embezzling and misappropriating funds raised 
through their televangelism crusades. 
This is a pattern that typically characterizes the end of a Great Awakening as its main leaders ei­
ther withdraw in disillusionment over America' s materialism and perceived moral bankruptcy, 
are themselves morally or politically discredited,105 or else incorporated back into the mainstream 
of American politics and culture. By this account, the third and final phase of the Fourth Great 
Awakening is drawing to a close and the political base for aglobaI nlessianic crusade is withering 
quite rapidly. The Christian Coalition now claims only 1 million active members compared to the 
50 million person mailing list (even if exaggerated) claimed by the Moral Majority. 
In addition, the Fourth Great Awakening is not only approaching intenlal exhaustion, but its eco­
nomic and political usefulness as a legitimating ideology for the dominant power bloc (finance 
capitallstate elites) is waning with the stabilization of a new social structure of accumulation. 
While a clash of civilizations may coincide with the global economic interests of a particular in­
dustrial sector (i.e., oil and oil services), it is certainly counter-productive for the other leading 
sectors of capital with global interests, particularly at the very point when American capital's 
global triumph is virtually assured for the time being. By almost any standard, the flexible re­
gime of global accumulation has been successfully established and stabilized from the standpoint 
of American capital based on any number indicators such as labor productivity, declining union 
density, inflation, GDP growth, and the V.S. share ofworld GDP. 
Moreover, a globally reconstituted American finance capital (which includes large high technol­
ogy, service, and other transnational corporations) is now so deeply embedded in a network of 
transnational economic relations, international organizations, and supra-national forms of global 
governance that it should be more interested in strengthening the emergent franlework of global 
105 For instance, Jonathan Edwards' prominent role in the First Great Awakening came to a sudden end despite the 
enthusiastic response to his preaching. His downfall came after a group of young people obtained a copy of an ob­
stetrics book and looked at the illustrations of the female anatomy. Edwards responded to the incident by preaching 
against it and condemned those involved from the pulpit. As a result, he alienated the youth's parents, who in good 
New England fashion, drove him from his ministerial position after which he was exiled to Stockbridge, Massa­
chusetts to work with the Indians until his death. 
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legal institutions and nlulti-Iateral enforcement mechanisms than in policing the new global sys­
tem as a lone cowboy. In his analysis of "the global state" for instance, Martin Shaw suggests 
that a new global-Western state will successfully mediate these contradictions, because "the ma­
jority of large transnational corporations are American-based" and this gives the USA "a pro­
found interest in the internationalization oflaw, especially commerciallaw.,,106 It would be fool­
hardy to predict a Pax Americana for as even Shaw argues the enlergence of a new global state 
anchored by American military and economic power is still an unfinished revolution, but there is 
reason to believe that the most frightening aspects of America's messianic mission, which logi­
cally ends only in the second coming of Christ -- the Apocalypse -- has at least been deferred to 
the next generation. 
106 Shaw, Theory ofthe Global State, p. 250. 
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